Hollins University

Hollins Digital Commons
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

Philosophy

1-2003

Human health and stoic moral norms
Lawrence C. Becker
Hollins University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.hollins.edu/philfac
Recommended Citation
Lawrence C. Becker; Human Health and Stoic Moral Norms. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2003; 28 (2): 221-238. Hollins
Digital Commons. Web.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Hollins Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy
Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Hollins Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lvilelle@hollins.edu,
millerjc@hollins.edu.

kt Jomnal of Medicine and Philosophy

~ 2003, Vol 28, No 2, pp . 221-238

0360-5310/03/2802-221 $1600
© Swets & Zeit1ingeI

Human Health and Stoic Moral Norms

1

Lawrence C. Becker
Department of Philosophy (Emeritus), College of William arrd Mary, Williamsburg, VA, USA

~

ABSTRACT
For the philosophy of medicine, there ar·e two things of interest a1;>out the stoic account 9f moral
norms, quite apart from whether the rest of stoic ethical theolY is compelling One is the stoic
version of naturalism: its account of practical reasoning, its solution to the is/ought problem,
arrd its contention that norms for creating, sustaining, or restoringhumarr health ar·e tarrtamount
to moral norms The other is the stoic account of humarr agency: its description of the intimate
connections between human health, rational agency, arrd moral norms.. There is practical
gnidarrce to be gained from exploring those connections, whether or not one is ready to follow
stoic moral theory all the way to its austere end
Keywords: humarr health, moral norms, practical reasoning, stoicism, virtue

L INTRODUCTION

",

Philosophers of medicine may find it useful to explore the resources of stoic!
ethical theory.. For one thing, stoic norms, like medical ones, are grounded in a
schematic account of human nature and diversity, with an implicit metaethic
that is parallel to norm-setting discussions in medicine about what constitutes
physical health for a given human individual in a given environment Both
normative enterprises thus grow out of preliminary, abstract descriptions
of human species-characteristics, but in their normative applications are
relentlessly particularistic - meant to be modified as needed for the peculiarities of particular cases.. For another thing, stoics argue for an intimate
connection between health and virtue - one so intimate, in fact, that for stoics,
effective health care is ipsofacto an element of caring for the recipient's moral
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development. Even if modem philosophers of medicine are ultimately
unpersuaded by that very strong thesis, they have a good deal to gain from
examining the case for it

II THE STOIC AGENDA
Stoics think it is no more difficult to derive norms about moral conduct from
facts about human physiology and psychology (human nature) than it is to derive
norms about health from those facts . It is true that humans differ from each other
considerably in their anatomy, physiology, and psychology. Yet there is general
agreement that we can derive philosophically defensible and determinative
medical norms from general facts about human nature, amended (when applied
to cases) by more specific information about the individuals and environments
involved.. We routinely derive, test and refine norms about nutritional
requirements, for instance, or lethal environments, or satisfactory blood gases,
or pathological mental states in this way. Even if it is true, as philosophers have
recently argued, that it is more or less futile to try to define medically significant
concepts of health, disease, and normality for human beings in the abstract,2
none of those authors supposes that the whole enterprise of medicine is futile, as
it would be if it were equally difficult to define medically significant norms of
health, disease, and normality in the full particularity of concrete cases . Such
particularistic medical norms collectively define the forms and conditions oflife
in which we believe human beings can be healthy, and no one is surprised to find
the arguments for them to be thoroughly naturalistic.
Suppose we say that moral norms, by contrast, define the forms of life in
which we believe human beings can be virtuous.. There is, of course,
remarkable diversity in the patterns of human conduct and character - in the
complex sets of intentions, beliefs, values, plans, hopes, expectations and
patterns of conduct that defirie various ways of life and conceptions of a life
worth living . But for stoics, moral norms define, first and foremost, the forms
of life in which human beings can be psychologically healthy, because stoics
hold that human moral excellence (virtue) just is the pinnacle of healthy
psychological development with respect to a special feature of paradigmatically human life: active rational agency. So when we get medical norms for
human psychological health trom facts about the world, we also get stoic
moral norms . Physical health enters the picture insofar as it is important for
psychological health, and hence, for virtue .
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For the philosophy of medicine, there are two things here of general
philosophical interest, quite apart from whether the rest of stoic ethical theory
is compelling . One is the stoic version of naturalism: its account of practical
reasoning, its solution to the is/ought problem, and its contention that norms
for creating, sustaining, or restoring human health are tantamount to moral
norms . The other is the stoic account of human agency: its description of the
intimate connections between human health, rational agency, and moral
norms There is practical guidance to be gained from exploring those
connections, whether or not one is ready to follow stoic moral theory all the
way to its austere end .
In what follows, I shall simply describe - mostly without much supporting
argument - the relevant stoic views, leaving to my nonstoic readers the
straightforward task of extracting items of philosophical interest

IlL METAETHICS: IS, OUGHT, MORAL NORMS,
AND ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION

The Moml Point of View. Stoics hold that nothing distinguishes moral
reasoning and the moral point of view from other forms of practical reasoning
except inclusiveness, and hence finality Moral reasoning is simply practical
reasoning all-things-considered . It is reasoning about what we ought to do
and be, but not from a special-purpose point of view such as prudence,
benevolence, legality, or efficiency - or health care . Its question is not "In
terms of prudence (or benevolence, or law, or efficiency), what ought I to do?"
but rather "Everything considered, what is it, finally, that I ought to do or be?"
Of all practical questions, this is the only one whose answer can have the
logical (as opposed to merely psychological) finality or ovetridingness people
expect moral judgments to have 3
From Is to Ought. Stoics hold that, just as there is no logical sleight of hand
in the derivation of special-purpose norms, there is nothing mysterious about
the derivation of moral norms In both cases we begin with an aim or a goal
that is "given" - already in operation in a game we are playing, ajob we are
doing, or more fundamentally, in our psychology. Such fundamental ends may
be either part of our genetic endowments, or our largely subconscious
psychological development, or our deliberate choices, but they already
contain implicit imperatives - norms for our behavior ("Be careful!", "Be
kind!", "Get satisfaction!,,)4
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Practical reasoning then does three things: (a) It finds any available means to
the given end 5 (b) Then for any means found, it asks whether there is a decisive
reason not to take it, both as compared to taking other means to the same end and
as compared to taking none of them. It assesses these matters both in the light of
conflicting ends we may have (our internal economy of competing purposes),
and in the light of relevant strategic considerations (how other people will react
if we take this step toward our goals) . And then (c) bom the remaining available
alternatives, if any, it selects one . This is an everyday process .
Think of playing chess . The aim is to win - to force the other player into
checkmate . That fundamental imperative is built into the enterprise . But for
most moves there are many alternatives to assess, both tactically and
strategically. And if the game is one of many in a championship match, or is
embedded in a controlling social project such as entertaining a guest, it may be
wise to forfeit or tie, thus violating the fundamental imperative of the game
considered by itself. The same sort of reasoning that regularly assesses and
implements norms within the game and in aid of its fundamental imperative
also assesses play in a wider context
Moral reasoning, for stoics, is simply the most wide-ranging form of
practical reasoning we can manage - one in which we try to consider every
possible means, every conceivable competing purpose we might have, every
possible ramification of and reaction to what we might do or strive to be . It is
practical reasoning all-things-considered 6
Ultimate Justification. Notice that moral reasoning of this all-encompassing
sort resolves the problem of ultimate justification by shifting the burden of proof
to the skeptic: If the game is already underway, then when we have established
by thoroughgoing reflection (on the fly, as it were), that there is no decisive
reason to stop or alter our activity, then for practical purposes we have gotten a
thoroughgoing justification of it 7 Skeptics who continue to ask for reasons for
endorsing what we are doing will put themselves in the comical position of
suggesting hesitation or change when a thorough search has uncovered no
decisive basis for it - the purest form of argumentum ad ignortantiam .

IV. NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY: HUMAN NATURE,
HEALTH AND VIRTUE
Stoics operate with the following schematic account of human moral
development 8 It is meant to describe a sequence of events that unfolds
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naturally in the course of every human life, given minimal conditions for
physical and psychological health.. Its end point is virtue, understood as
excellence in active rational agency, and such excellence is understood as a
similarly natural development, first from mere health into fitness, and then
from fitness into virtuoso agency9 "Natural development" here means
nothing more than unimpeded development: a trajectory set in motion and
sustained by the healthy human constitution itself in a very wide range of
circumstances., Medical norms related to agency - that is, the norms that
define the necessary and sufficient conditions for creating, sustaining or
restoring healthy agency - are thus identical to the norms that define the
conditions for creating, sustaining or restoring stoic moral development and
virtue,
This stoic account of moral development begins with a thesis about the
behavior of infants in the cradle - a thesis that contrasts sharply with other
ancient (and some modern) accounts of the same matters" Epicureans, for
example, along with some modern behaviorists, insist that the controlling
motivation of infants is to seek pleasure and avoid pain, and that this is
evidence for thinking that pleasure is the ultimate or final human good" Such
an inference is not plausible, however, unless we also hold that human
development does not radically transform or eliminate infant behavior but is
rather a matter of growth and maturation - of increasing the size, subtlety,
complexity, and power of what we start with as infants, along the trajectory
suggested by our earliest behavior.. But the Stoics r{)jected both the pleasure/
pain account of infant motivation and the growth/maturation account of
development
On the Stoic account, infants in the cradle are motivated primarily by their
attachment to and "affection" for themselves - attachment and affection that
show themselves in behavior aimed at self~preservation and the satisfaction of
"impulses" of many sorts" The Stoics insisted on the point (as a matter of
observational knowledge) that infants often subordinate pleasure-seeking to
other pursuits, such as efforts to move, to explore their environment, to
observe, respond, mimic and learn lO They believed that the obvious
explanation for such behavior was that infants had a primitive consciousness
of themselves and their interests, and a built-in affection (appropriate
disposition) for preserving themselves and satisfying all of their interests"
Moreover, the Stoics held that psychological development was self~
transformative in a predictable way, In their view, mature human beings
were fundamentally different creatures from immature onesl l And they held,

/
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against the Aristotelians, that habituation was not the fi.mdamental mechanism
of character formation . Rather, they thought that the fundamental mechanism
was oikeiosis . 12
Here is how the mechanism works, according to the Stoics . Early in infancy
children's natural affection for themselves is extended to external physical
objects and states that are (or appear to them to be) instrumental to satisfying
their primal impulses . Infants acquire an affection for the people who care for
them effectively, and for comforting or pleasurable or useful o~jects . Then a
fundamental transformation occurs . Children soon begin to "appropriate"
these useful objects psychologically - making the external things· "their
own," as it were, in a way that makes the affection for them like the natural
affection the infants have for themselves. This makes the children disposed to
preserve (and act for) the external things in the same way they are disposed to
preserve and act for themselves . Thus the initial, conditional affection for the
things as means to ends is converted, through oikeiosis, into an affection that is
quite independent of perceptions of a thing's instrumental worth. Even if the
caretaker has become umeliable, or the useful object is broken, once we have
"appropriated" such things, we have affection for them in themselves, for
their own sakes . They have intrinsic value for us .
It is instructive to think about what sorts of health concerns we might have
about this psychological appropriation or internalization of objects . We are
rightly concerned about the extent to which children (and adults) might
become over-attached to objects - so attached that they are unable to cope
with separation or loss; so attached that separation or loss is a serious
impediment to health, requiring intervention to set things back on course . We
are likely to recommend, as a matter of mental health, that those who take care
of children take steps to moderate their o~ject-attachments, and to teach them
to cope with loss . This is precisely the concern stoics have about the way
psychological attachments can compromise moral development, and the stoic
remedy is the same: make sure that the attachments are compatible with the
ability to cope with 10SS . 13
The next major step in (stoic) development occurs when children acquire
language and begin to represent states of affairs and causal connections to
themselves, and to generalize, hypothesize, and make rules about how to get
what they want The same two-step process occurs here as well, with dramatic
consequences.. Children first develop an affection for the beliefs and
inferences that are instrumental (the ones that work; the "correct" ones),
just because those are the ones that work A similar affection arises for
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rule-following behavior that is successfuL Then, through oikeiosis, children at
a surprisingly early age begin to appropriate their useful beliefs, generalizations, rules, and expectations - and thus to convert affection for the
instrumental worth of such things into affection for the things in themselves .
Children thus come to have an affection for true belief~ correct conduct, and
rule-following for its own sake, quite independently of valuing it for its
usefulness.. This is, moreover, a recursive process, Beliefs are repeatedly
modified in the light of new experience., Inconsistencies are repeatedly dealt
with in order to make it possible for conduct to conform to all the beliefs one
has., Children thus come to value coherence and consistency as well as
correctness - first for instrumental reasons, and then through oikeiosis, for rts
own sake,.
The health concerns we commonly have about this step in the process are
also parallel to stoic ones, along three normative dimensions . One is a strong
prohibition on any interference with the acquisition of language and the
development of the cognitive abilities inherent in fluent language use - not
only with respect to the memory, imagination of the future, and self awareness
that arise or develop with language, but also with respect to the basic patterns
of thought (relevance, consistency, inference, explanation, prediction)
developed with it The inability to acquire these things, given a reasonably
hospitable environment, is conclusive medical evidence of ill-health or a
deficiency that calls for corrective treatment Deliberate infliction of such
inability on a child would be prohibited, just in terms of what counts as health
care, in almost any imaginable environment These are medical norms, based
on notions of physical and psychological health, but they are also stoic moral
norms, based on the definition of virtue as the perfection of the activity of
rational agency.
A second normative parallel is a requirement that we actively enable or
assist children in the acquisition of language and the cognitive abilities arising
flom it This too is common ly thought of as part of caring for the health of the
child, and in stoic ethical theory, it is caring for the child's moral development
as welL
And finally, there is a parallel between health care and stoic moral norms
with respect to the dangers involved in this step . It is dangerous to our health
(and to stoic moral development) to become "rule-bound" - too attached to
particular routines, rules, or patterns of thought, or to particular memories or
expectations., When such attachments interfere with major life activities, our
health is compromised .
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The penultimate step in the stoic developmental story comes with the
realization of the instrumental value of practical intelligence itself, and the
attendant affection that we eventually develop for the general ability to do
things correctly - in the right way, for the right reasons . This is quite distinct
from the affection for getting the desired outcome . The novice archer wants to
hit the target, certainly, but soon comes to appreciate that the most reliable
way to get that result is by making the shot correctly.. And this lesson, once
learned in a few contexts, is generalized into an affection for practical abilities
of all sorts.. Affection for the usefulness of these things is then also
transformed, through oikeiosis, into an affection for them that is quite
independent of their utility We come to value, for its own sake, the ability to
do things in the right way for the right reasons . Or so stoics suppose .
The final step, stoics suppose, comes from the persistent commitment to
cultivate practical intelligence, once we love it both for its utility and for its
own sake . This is the step that puts people decisively on the path to stoic
virtue, though like paths to other forms of virtuosity, few take it To take it is to
see that hitting the target (getting many of the things we want) is not ultimately
within our control, and not within our control at all except through the correct
exercise of our practical intelligence . Getting that much right (perfecting our
ability to do the right thing in the right way) then becomes our paramount
concern in every context At first, of course, we want this merely as a means to
our other ends . But it is quite natural to appropriate it as well, and through
oikeiosis, come to have a paramount concern for perfecting the exercise of our
practical intelligence for its own sake .
For these two last steps of the stoic account of moral development, it is
probably not possible to make the case for a close parallel between medical
norms and stoic moral ones . That is because these steps take matters beyond
health into the areas of fitness and virtuosity. Medicine sometimes ventures
into this terrain - in sports medicine, performance-enhancing tr·eatrnents,
cosmetic procedures, and so forth - but there is persistent dissent about its
connection to health, and hence its appropriateness as a medical concern.. In
terms of the norms implicit in health care itself, this sort of medicine seems at
most merely permissible . By contrast, since stoics see virtue as a level of
rational agency far beyond mere health, their moral norms address this
accordingly. Deliberately impeding the development from health to fitness,
and from fitness to virtuoso agency is prohibited; supporting it is required . But
perfectionistic aims unrelated to virtue (the whitest possible teeth, for
example) are decisively matters of indifference for stoics .
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V APPLYING STOIC THEORY TO CASES
IN MEDICAL ETHICS
This discussion has been quite abstract, and it may be usefUl at this point to
bring it to bear on some concrete issues in medical ethics - especially on some
much discussed issues, in order to see more clearly whether there is anything
new here . These illustrations will necessarily be sketchy, and to simplify the
expository problems, I will confine them to topics that have been thoroughly
worked over by utilitarians, Kantians, and modem Aristotelians . I will begin
with some general remarks about applying stoic principles to cases, and then
move on to consider questions about suicide, assisted suicide, euthanasia, and
quality of life.
A. Moving from Theory to Practice, in General
Particularism . Stoics are particularists about moral decision-making . That
means two things.. First, stoics expect to be able to construct concrete
normative advice about many of the details of how a given person should act in
a given situation. Stoic ethical theory is aimed quite directly at actual practice,
not merely at constructing sets of general principles . But second, stoics do not
expect to be able to deal with moral cases a priori . The details will always
depend on who the people involved are (in terms of their character, ability,
knowledge, limitations) and what their physical and social circumstances are .
This does not mean that stoics are moral relativists . Surgeons, after all, are not
considered epistemological relativists when they operate in terms of the
nonstandard anatomy they see before them on the table rather than in terms of
the normative expectations they acquired in the course of their medical
education and practice. In a similar way, stoics are particularists without being
relativists in the moral judgments they make about particular cases .
Internalism about conceptions of virtue and a good life.. The stoic
conception of virtue and human good is constructed from considerations
"internal" to the constitution or nature of physically and psychologically
healthy human beings . That conception of virtue is normative for such human
beings only. Sharks have their own form of excellence, and their own form of a
good life . It would not be intrinsically good for sharks (as opposed to good for
other fish) if we tried to teach them to read, and to respect the rights of
bluefish. Similarly, humans with significantly abnormal constitutions - in
particular, abnormal psychological constitutions - will have significantly
abnormal forms of virtue and conceptions of the good internal to their
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constitutions . Only if such abnormalities are temporary or reversible would it
be intrinsically good for them (as opposed to good for other humans) if we
tried to press a stoic conception of virtue on them.
_
Nonpaternalism and appreciation of difference . It does not follow from the
fact that stoics endorse the perfection of active, rational agency for normally
developing human beings that they are thereby committed to an uncaring
attitude toward human beings who have permanently ceased to be rational
agents, or who are prevented, by disability, from becoming rational agents.
Moreover, stoic theory does not entail a dismissive or uncaring attitude toward
nonhuman animals, as has sometimes been alleged.. On the contrary, on the
stoic account, when healthy human beings develop through oikeiosis an
interest in the well-being of others for their own sakes,that interest is an
interest in their having whatever counts as a good life for them, no matter how
different that might be from what counts as a good life for us .
Appreciation of difference must be cosmopolitan, but not self-defeating..
Oikeiosis transforms our thinking about others, and about their various
properties or characteristics . We begin with an appreciation of how others, or
some of their characteristics, ar·e instrumental goods for ourselves and move to
an appreciation of how those others or characteristics are good in themselves .
Stoic theory is cosmopolitan in insisting that it is wrong to confine this process
to locals, or to objects of the most basic and immediate instrumental value to
us . We live in the whole world as well as in a particular part of it; we live
lifetimes as well as in the moment; we have elaborate intellectual, aesthetic,
social, and psychological needs . It is just an error to imagine that the only
things, animals, and people that are instrumentally good for us are things,
animals, and people in our immediate vicinity, or that are in our most basic and
immediate interests .
Moreover, it is an error to confuse token with type, or part with whole .
Oikeiosis operates on parts and types as well as whole individuals, and stoic
moral psychology is thoroughly conventional in accounting for how we can
come to "love the man and hate the sin;" or to believe that a certain sort of
person typically has characteristic X, even if all the ones we know personally
lack X. These part-whole &stinctions can lead us into errors - invidious
prejudices, denial, blind loyalty and so forth . But once we prevent or correct
those errors, sound distinctions and inferences widen the bounds of our purely
instrumental appreciation of others, and through oikeiosis we develop a
similarly widened appreciation of the intrinsic worth of a worldwide range of
other objects, animals and people . Notice, however, that this process does not
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get off the ground directly in cases where something (say, the polio vilUs) has
no known instrumental value for us, basic or otherwise, in part or in whole, as
a type or a token . Nor does it get off the ground directly in our confrontation
with some human beings (say, relentless killers) whose only relation to us
threatens our survival, 01 ability to thrive . Indirectly, oikeiosis can give us a
limited appreciation of intrinsic WOlth in such cases.. We can acquire an
appreciation of the intrinsic worth of some of the properties of beneficial
viruses, for example, and then extrapolate that admiration to all viruses with
similar properties . We can extrapolate our appreciation of various aspects of
beneficial human agency to similar aspects of the agency of relentless killers .
But on a stoic account, the recommended forms of such appreciation of
intrinsic worth will be only those developed through oikeiosis, and action
based on that appreciation must not be self~defeating.. It must be aimed at
creating a maintaining arrangements in which threatening things or people can
flourish on their own terms without defeating our own pursuit of virtue .

B. Suicide and Assisted Suicide
The ancient Stoics notoriously endorsed suicide, and it seems fair to say that
they would have been willing to endorse some forms of assisted suicide, had
they directly addressed the question . After all, if death by his own hand was
the right thing for Cato, given his circumstances, then it is hard to see why it
would necessarily have been wrong for someone to hand him a sword at his
request, 01 sharpen it for him while he finished his other business . The stories
ancient philosophers tell of stoic suicides usually do involve such assistance,
and it is not questioned But we should remember that stoic constraints on
suicide itself are stringent, and the nature of the justification offered for it
guarantees that assisted suicide will rarely be justified . This fits rather well
with existing norms for medical practice. To see why this is so, consider:
Stoics endorse suicide if and only if it is the last best option for the expression
of rational agency in a particular life (as it might have been for Seneca, given
his character and circumstances, after Nero sentenced him to death).. This
endorsement is derived from the stoic doctrine that it is our activity as rational
agents. that is the only thing of ultimate value as an end . But it also follows
from this doctrine that suicide as a way of merely escaping pain, or
unpleasantness, or depression, or the burdens of rational agency itself would
not be justified. For stoics, the quality of one's life as a healthy, normally
formed human being is not measured, ultimately, by the hedonic quality of
one's experience . What counts is one's ability to understand the world and to
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act effectively in it That, and not hedonic tone, is the source of happiness, and
stoics famously hold that one can be "happy" (flourish, have a good life) in
that sense in prison, or in slavery, or (as Marcus Aurelius wryly observes) in a
palace . Sages, it is said, can even be happy on the rack, though they will groan
in pain as much as anyone else.
If modem medical norms were to follow stoic ones on the question of
suicide and end-of~life discussions, as they now often proceed in political and
ethical discussions, they would have to be reframed in a fundamental way.
(Oddly, it is not clear that existing medical practice would be as significantly
changed . Perhaps there is a good deal of stoic theory already embedded in
medical norms.) Stoics do not frame these issues primarily in terms of
imminent death and the bad hedonic quality of the dying person's experience .
Those are subsidiary matters, and legal statutes or professional codes of ethics
that try to restrict "death with dignity" decisions to those circumstances
would be repudiated by stoics . Moreover, stoics do not frame these issues in
terms of a priori absolutes about the infinite moral worth of every human life,
whether characterized by rational agency or not, and would repudiate any
absolute requirement to preserve human life in a persistent vegetative state
Similarly, palliative treatments that permanently compromise the dying
person's rational agency would be repudiated .
The primary issue for stoic theory and stoic medical practice is whether the
dying person can be sustained as an active, effective rational agent The
answer to that question will always be person-specific, and will depend as
much on that person's psychological set up and social circumstances as on his
or her medical condition. It may be that sages can be happy in virtually any
circumstances, but we are not all sages, and stoic ethical theory instructs us to
deal with people as we find them, not as we wish they were . Some people find
life as a quadriplegic unbearable precisely because they can no longer be
active rational agents in any way they recognize as worthwhile, no matter how
vividly we can imagine such a life for them, and no matter how persistently we
try to show them how to live that life . Satisfying ourselves that they are
medically stable, well cared for, and provided with opportunities to make
active new lives for themselves may well end our medical obligations to them,
but it will notjustify (on a stoic account) requiring them to remain alive under
those conditions, or ignoring their advance medical directives .
Neither does it justify assisted suicide, however.. Of course it is true that
many of the things we do in our daily lives require the active cooperation and
participation of other people . This could also be the case for suicide, and there
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is nothing in stoic ethical theOlY that requires us to withhold our ordinary
cooperativeness and crue from people who rue (justifiably) making prepruations to end their lives . But the same stoic doctrine that endorses suicide
when it is the last best thing we can do as rational agents would refuse to
endorse any assisted suicide in which the assistance is designed to replace a
capable, would-be suicide's own agency with another's, or to compensate for
the would be suicide's ferus or lack of resolve . That rules out the Dr.
Kevorkian cases, and perhaps most others in which people call for assistance
from medical proiessionals . 14
In general, however, it seems to me that the most illuminating thing about a
stoic approach to these questions is the way in which it directs our attention
away from thinking about life as a vessel for expe!ience - one that is good
only to the degree that it is filled with experience that is, on balance, pleasant
rather than painful 15 Likewise, it directs our attention away from the thought
that the only tolerable forms of life rue ones in which we can hang on to some
minimum of what we already have, or in which we can preserve some
previously constructed identity. Rather, stoic moral nOlms direct our attention
to the possibilities for making and remaking good lives for ourselves as active,
rational agents . Norms for medical practice (in end-of-life situations) that rue
in line with those stoic ideas rue intellectually refreshing to consider.

c. Euthanasia and Lives Worth Liviug
For aspiring stoic sages, the only life wOlth living is a life of stoic virtue, and
the only good death is a death consistent with such virtue . But as I have
remruked previously, in stoic theory that is a judgment only about the lives of
people with a certain type of constitution or nature - namely, the generic
constitution of a mature and healthy human being. Human infants have a
significantly different constitution, in which rational agency is at most a
prospect, and the same is true to lesser degrees for children up to the age of
reason (roughly 14, according to the ancient Stoics), and for formerly healthy
adults whose rational agency has been damaged by disease or injury. The
prospects for their development or return to rational agency define, in lruge
measure, the nature and extent of moral nOlms for paternalistic mtervention both medical and routine . In standrud cases, we take the steps needed to help
along the nOlmal course of development or rehabilitation, and these steps
sometimes involve considerable discomfOlt or pain for the patient
But suppose the child (or damaged adult) lacks the potential for rational
agency? I suggest that stoic theory then requires us to reconsider what counts
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as a good life for that particular human being, and to make decisions about
interventions based on our appreciation of the intrinsic worth of that sort of
life,for that human being, and not merely for us . This immediately rules out
any form of euthanasia based merdy on the patient's lack of capacity for
rational agency. Rather, the relevant question will be whether the patient has
the prospect (given social circumstances), for a life that is worthwhile in terms
intrinsic to the patient's actual constitution. If the patient is only capable of a
primitive form of awareness (not self~awareness), and thus is only a vessel for
limited forms of sense experience, the only thing that will count as a good life
for that patient is a favorable balance of pleasure over pain. Consider three
possibilities for such cases .
(1) Medically, it may be that no such favorable balance can be sustained,

because it may be that sustaining the life without a preponderance of pain
would mean sustaining it without consciousness . In such cases, euthanasia
is surely an option stoics would immediately consider.. It seems
pointlessly cruel, other things equal, to inflict or prolong such pain, and
it is hard to see how mere human life, without consciousness, could be
considered intrinsically good for the bearer of that life . 16 But presumably
stoics would also take seriously the standard range of policy arguments
defending the view that there are other things at stake in these cases as
well - such as the difficulty in designing social institutions that will
prevent vicious slippery slopes, and the difficulty posed for the moral
psychology of people who euthanize other human beings.. Here stoic
theory probably has little to add to existing discussions .
(2) Medically, it might be that a favorable balance of pleasure over pain can
be sustained for these patients, but that social circumstances will
inevitably undermine such medical efforts . One can imagine extremities
of war or poverty or social organization that reduce these patients'
prospects for a good life to zero . Euthanasia would have to be as seriously
considered here as it is in the cases of medical impossibility
(3) Medically and socially, it might be possible to sustain a good quality of
life for these patients, but it might also be very costly, thus significantly
reducing resources and opportunities for healthy human agents . Here stoic
ethical theory would give a typically austere response. Stoics would begin
with the point that for healthy, mature human agents, the only thing of
ultimate moral significance is virtue - the perfection of active rational
agency. All other things, including money, fame, social standing,
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influence, and worldly achievement ate ultimately matters of "indifference" - some of them preferable to others, to be sure, but none of them
compatable in impOltance to virtue . So for stoics, the expense, difficulty
or inconvenience of eating fOl these patients is beside the point if eating
for them is required by virtue, pr at least is consistent with it If so, then
the only further issue is whether this enterprise would be self~defeating ultimately compromising one's pursuit of virtue, and through it, a good
life . But if, as stoics believe, a good (stoic) life is possible in slavery, or in
poverty, or in a palace, then the circumstances in which cating for another
will genuinely compromise one's good life in stoic terms ate extreme
ones.. On this ~uestion, stoic ethical theOlY diverges shatplyrrom
utilitatian analysis, for exatnple.

VL WHY SHOULD PHILOSOPHERS OF MEDICINE
BOTHER WITH STOICISM?

Stoics have often been dismissed as eccentric, even as fanatic, in their
insistence that virtue is the only good, that it is an all or nothing affair rather
than a matter of degree, and that the virtuous person - the sage - is undisturbed
by passions or attachments . That dismissive reaction is unfounded, I believe .
But in any case those issues ate irrelevant here, since the elements of stoic
ethics assembled above ate not the eccentric ones . The metaethical elements
ate congruent with the most sophisticated forms of naturalism in the
philosophical repertoire; the valorization of rational agency (as at least one
fundatnental good) is common currency in ethical theory; a close connection
between human psychological health and virtue is a common assumption of
ancient (Westem) ethical theories, and has been central to theories of moral
responsibility ever since . So at that very general level there is not even much
novelty here, let alone eccentricity
Attention to stoic metaethics, and to the close patallels between the norms
of medicine and stoic moral norms ate nonetheless instructive . This is so, I
believe, because it makes a plausible case for thinking that stoic moral theoryand possibly most other ethical theories- ate enlatgements or extensions of
the norms implicit in health cate, and not something sepatate from such
norms.. Medical norms ate at the center of moral ones, as it were,
simultaneously anchOling them, and being ratified by their reflective
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endOlsement, all-things-considered. And if that is the case, it should be
productive, both for medical ethics and for ethics per se, to make sure that the
two realms achieve a stable, thorough theoretical integration - or failing that,
at least consistency within reflective equilibrium.
Stoic ethical theOIY provides a useful platform for pursuing that theoretical
integration . Stoicism is not a mere historical curiosity. Its influence on Westem
philosophy has been continuous and significant for over two thousand years . Its
ethical theory, once disentangled from its theological metaphysics, has a striking
and persuasive connection to modem science, and remains philosophically
formidable . In sum, stoicism provides a clear; coherent, and refreshing alternative to the standard inventOIY of contemporary ethical theories .

NOTES
1. I distinguish the ancient Stoics flOm their contemporary descendants by using a lowercase
's' for the latter. The outline of what I take to be a philosophically defensible contemporary
version of stoic ethical theory can be found in my book A New Stoicism (1998). This paper
is part of a continuing investigation of stoic ethics, other pieces of which will simply be
referenced rather than summarized in this paper .
2 For some of the relevant discussion see Toon (1981); Vacha (1985); Brown (1985);
Merskey (1986); and Sade (1995).
3.. For fuller accounts ofthese points in terms of ethical theory generally, see my "The finality
of moral judgments" (1973) and Chapters 1 and 2 of Reciprocity (1986)..
4. Contemporary stoics are divided about whether tojettison the ancient Stoic conception of a
cosmic telos - the notion that the universe itself is a rational being within whose grand
purposes humans have assigned roles. This controversy, while it makes a big difference in
other matters, does not make a difference in this one
5. Legend has it that GE Moore was once asked if he thought the ends justified the means,
and that he replied, "What else could?" If the end E is a given, and M is a means to E, then
E is by definition a reason for doing M, though not necessarily a conclusive one. (M may be
prohibited; there may be a quicker, cheaper, more reliable way to get to E; etc.).
6 This was the standard view of moral reasoning in Classical Greek and Hellenistic ethics .
See Julia Annas: "My station and its duties: ancient ethics and the social embeddedness of
virtue," December 2000 symposium on the Legacy of Greek Ethics at the Eastern Division
meeting of the APA I am told, but have not verified, that it is also characteristic of some
ancient Asian traditions, notably Confucian and Buddhist ones It is often obscured or
incautiously abandoned in divine command and supreme principle moralities But that
raises notorious theoretical difficulties See Baier (1958); Foot (1972); etc .
7. This point is developed at length in Becker (1973)
8 The expository parts of this section, though not the interwoven observations on health
concerns and medical norms, closely follow the ones I give in "Stoic Children", and in A
New Stoicism. But of course the expository parts ar·e not meant to be novel. They are meant
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to conform to the ancient texts, especially Cicero, De Flnibus Book ill, and the best modern
scholarship on the ancient sources
9 For a much more detailed account of the process, see A New Stoicism, Chapter 6, and for
evidence from contemporary psychology to support the account, see the "Commentary" to
Chapter 6.
10 Cicero, De Finibus ill ..v
11 (3) "Each period of life has its own constitution, one for the baby, and another for the boy,
another for the youth, and another for the old man . They are all related appropriately to that
constitution in which they exist" (Seneca, Letters 121 15)
12 The term oikeiosis is hard to put into English It has sometimes been translated as
familiarization, because it has the same root as house or family. But it is probably better
translated as attachment, incorporation, or appropriation I will follow Long and Sedley
(1987) in using the English term appropriation for it
.
13 Stoics are not theoretically committed to anything stronger than this Though some early
Stoics apparently insisted that in the sage, such attachment to externals, and indeed the
passions generally, would be completely rooted out, such insistence can only be supported
if it is necessary for excellence in agency. We have good reasons, however, for agreeing
with other stoics that the extirpation of attachments and passions is neither psychologically
possible in healthy humans, nor necessary for virtue . For the debate, see Inwood (1985,
chap. 5); Striker (1991, pp . 62-73); as well as Becker (1998, chap 6, and Commentary to
that chapter)..
14 In June of 1993, at the Third International Post-Polio Conference organized by GINI, a
German judge challenged a panel of physicians and philosophers to describe a case in
which it was impossible for a rational person, unimpeded by others, to bring about his own
death in and at a reasonable time, without direct assistance from others beyond their
provision of standard, life-sustaining care. It was a surprisingly difficult challenge to meet
Most of the supposed impossibilities hinged on the agent's fears or lack of resolve - things
that stoics would regard as evidence that the person was unable to meet the conditions for
rational suicide . A quadriplegic on a ventilator, for example, supplied with a motorized
wheelchair in the normal comse of rehabilitation, could plan and carry out many forms of
suicide.
15 John Rawls has an illuminating discussion of the concept of persons as "containers" for
experience versus that of "autonomous persons who have certain fundamental interests "
in his 1975 Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical
Association (1999, pp . 287-300)..
16 Any living being, animal or vegetable, can flourish or not, in ways appropriate to its
constitution. But presumably the presence of some sort of subjective experience is
necessary to license eudaimonistic concerns about good lives, and that includes the lives
of humans reduced to a permanent vegetative state .
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